

The Impact of Information-Granularity and Prioritization on Patients' Care Modality Choice

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Joint work with


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Telemedicine Adoption

- Growth in telemedicine usage peaked during April 2020 but has since stabilized

Telehealth claims volumes, compared to pre-Covid-19 levels (February 2020 = 1)¹



Pros and Cons of Telemedicine

- Pro:
 - Could get appointment sooner
 - Save time and money
 - In the safety of patient's own home or workplace
- Con:
 - Telemedicine is not right for every situation

Duplicative care: Unsuitable telemedicine visits lead to **redundant** in-person evaluation, which in turn generates more workload for the system

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DIVE BRIEF

Does telemedicine result in duplicative care? Depends on the patient, study suggests

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
Rebecca Pifer
Senior Reporter




Pros and Cons of Telemedicine

- The level of duplicative care after telemedicine is heterogeneous, and depends highly on the specialty and the patient

Specialty care



Primary care



The Choice Is in Patients' Hands

Growing Pains: [...] As the system grew quickly, providers were also frustrated with having **inappropriate patients scheduled for video visits** versus in-person visits and wanted **changes to the triaging and scheduling system**”

- Srinivasan et al. *Annals of internal medicine* (2020)

Problem:

Patients lack information to make self-interested decisions

Possible remedy:

Design an online-triage tool to provide information and recommendation

Questions:

Does providing more information to patients reduce duplicate care?
Are there other operational tools that can improve system performance?

Related Literature

- Telemedicine adoption and patients' behavior:
 - Bavafa et al. (2018), Lekwijit et al. (2023) , Qin et al. (2023) , Staats et al. (2017), Li et al. (2021), Sun and Wang (2021), Delana et al. (2023), Saghafian et al. (2018) , Bavafa et al. (2021), Cakıcı and Mills (2022), Rajan et al. (2019) , Ding et al. (2022) , Liu et al. (2023)
- Information Design for Service Systems:
 - Aksin et al. (2017), Yu et al. (2017, 2022), Ibrahim (2018) , Argon and Ziya (2009), Sun et al. (2022), Singh et al. (2024) , Hu et al. (2022)
- Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems:
 - Naor (1969), Edelson and Hilderbrand (1975), Hassin (1986), Hassin and Haviv (2003) , Hassin (2016), Hassin and Roet-Green (2017, 2021), Mendelson and Whang (1990), Afeche and Mendelson (2004), Afeche et al. (2019), Hu et al. (2022) , Cui et al. (2023), Shumsky and Pinker (2003), Freeman et al. (2017), Hathaway et al. (2023) , Roet-Green and Shetty (2022)

Our Contribution

Addressing the question of care redundancy: How and when to implement **online triaging** and **prioritization** in a dual care modalities system

Model

- **A queueing-game model** that incorporates:
 - Patients' choices between care modalities
 - Two operational levers: Information, Prioritization

Case study

- **A prediction model** that forecasts the need for a follow-up visit after a telemedicine visit
- **Model calibration:** how priorities and triage impact waiting times?

QUEUEING-GAME MODEL


Motivation

Queueing Game

Case Study

Summary

The Model



Two Information Granularity Regimes

	Information	Average chance for a follow-up	Patient's own chance for a follow-up
→	Crude Information	Know	Unknow
→	Refined Information	Know	Know

Patients' Strategies

- Patients' decision is based on wait-time comparison
- If the patient chooses in-person visit:


$$W_{in_person} = W_2$$

- If the patient chooses telemedicine:

$$W_{tele} = W_1 + W_2 * 1_{\{follow-up\}}$$

Patients' objective: minimize the expected total waiting time

Patients' strategy: a probability of joining tele-visits



Patients' Equilibrium Strategy


Crude information regime:

- There exists a unique crude equilibrium strategy:
P% of the patients choose telemedicine
(1-P)% of the patients choose in-person

Refined information regime:


- There exists a unique refined equilibrium that depends on patient's health severity level

Follow-up probability



Does Providing More Information Help?

- Assessing the online triage tool in terms of **average waiting time**




Conclusion: Providing more information may increase the average waiting time!


System's First Best

- System's first best strategy \bar{t} : Centralized routing decisions with refined information to achieve the minimum average waiting time


Avg follow-up prob high: Conservative



Avg follow-up prob low: Proactive




System's First Best vs. Refined Equilibrium




Coordination Mechanism: Priority Rule


Case 1: $t^* < \bar{t}$



Case 2: $t^* > \bar{t}$





Coordination Mechanism: Priority Rule



Effect of The Two Operational Levers

- Performance measure: Average waiting time



CASE STUDY

Motivation

Queueing Game

Case Study

Summary

Prediction Model

- We collect data regarding outpatient visits at a large academic hospital in Maryland from 01/2020 to 09/2023
- Starting from 2021, the hospital **provided telemedicine options for a variety of preprocedural examinations**
- Visit code = Z01818
- 3,275 total visits, 210 telemedicine visits (**6.412% usage rate**)


Prediction Model

- Prediction target: whether a patient requires an in-person follow-up visit within 7, 14, 21, and 30 days of a prior visit
- Logistic regression with the following covariates:
 - Time fixed effect: **year, quarter**
 - Patient demographic information: **age, sex, ethnicity, county**
 - Ailment types: **diagnosis codes**
 - Payment type: **commercial insurance, self-pay, Medicare, Medicaid, charity**
 - Source of arrival: **home, other hospital sites**
 - Comorbidities: **Charlson comorbidity index**
 - Personal preference for in-person visits: **# in-person visits in 2020**
 - Care modality: **telemedicine, in-person visit**

Prediction Model

- The logistic regression outputs the probability of requiring an in-person follow-up visit after telemedicine

Distribution of 7-day in-person follow-up probabilities



- Heterogeneity in the efficacy of telemedicine treatment across patients

Model Calibration

- Hourly arrival rate of the sample patients

$$\lambda = \frac{\# \text{ sample patients}}{\# \text{ working hours}} = 0.572 \text{ patients/hour}$$


- Hourly service speed of the sample patients via telemedicine

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_1 &= \frac{60 \text{ min per hour}}{23 \text{ min per telemedicine visit}} \times \text{proportion of sample patients} \\ &= 0.039 \text{ patients/hour}\end{aligned}$$

- Hourly service speed of the sample patients via in-person visits

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_2 &= \text{telemedicine service rate} \times \frac{\text{in-person throughput}}{\text{telemedicine throughput}} \\ &= 0.566 \text{ patients/hour}\end{aligned}$$

Counterfactual Analysis



Counterfactual Analysis

- Parameter regime: Information 😊, information & priority 😊
- Crude equilibrium, refined equilibrium, system's first best

	Crude	Refined	First Best
	p^*	t^*	\bar{t}
Strategy	4.3%	3.9%	5.6%

- Average waiting time (days)

Average waiting time	Crude	Refined	First Best
Across all patients	14.48	8.56 41%↓	6.18
At the telemedicine queue	8.76	7.62	19.14
Average waiting time	14.48	8.58	5.38

Counterfactual Analysis

- Parameter regime: Information 😊, information & priority 😊
- Crude equilibrium, refined equilibrium, system's first best

	Crude	Refined	First Best
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Average waiting time	Crude	Refined	Priority	First Best
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At the telemedicine queue	8.76	7.62	8.08	19.14
At the in-person queue	14.48	8.58	8.11	5.38

Summary

- **Our Contribution**

- A queueing-game model
- Two operational levers
- Case study using real-world data

- **Takeaway**

- With the online triage tool, equilibrium under refined information may not outperform the equilibrium under crude information
- Proper priority rule can turn the information disadvantage into advantage

Thank you!